California Defamation Law Blog : Los Angeles Defamation & Anti-SLAPP Lawyer & Attorney : Adrianos Facchetti Law Firm

Lutfi scores another important victory. The Second District Court of Appeals, in Los Angeles, affirmed the trial judge's decision denying Spears's (not Britney--her mother) anti-SLAPP motion. If you recall, Spears wrote a book and included some statements about Lufti, which he didn't like very much, to put it mildly. So he sued her claiming libel, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Spears's advanced three main arguments on appeal:

• Lutfi was libel-proof (in other words, his reputation was so bad already that he couldn't possibly have sustained any damage as a result of the statements in the book.)
• Lutfi was a limited purpose figure and couldn't establish actual malice
• The alleged defamatory statements are protected opinions

The Court rejected each of Spears's arguments. Of particular interest was its analysis of the libel-proof doctrine in this case. Because no California court has applied this doctrine to any case, the Court looked to a 2nd circuit decision and a decision from the Central District for guidance. The Court declined to apply the libel doctrine because those cases were factually different than Lufti's case. Specifically, they involved plaintiffs who evidenced a clear propensity for the offending conduct in the past, or, who admitted to committing such conduct. Here, Lufti was neither convicted of any of alleged offenses described in the book, nor did he admit to having committed any of the alleged offenses. So the Court determined that the libel-proof doctrine did not apply.

I think this was a relatively easy decision for the Court to make. Lutfi had plenty of evidence to show a probability of prevailing on the merits. And a fact finder could decide that some of the arguably rhetorical or hyperbolic statements are defamatory when considered in their proper context.

I also believe California should not adopt the libel-proof doctrine for two reasons. First, its application is doubtful in light of recent United States Supreme Court precedent. Second, it would rarely apply and would cause confusion in the law.

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This is a question that comes up quite frequently and appears to be a source of some confusion. The law is that motions to strike a state law claim are proper in California Federal courts, e.g., libel, slander, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. This is so because there is no conflict between the Federal rules and Code of Civil Procedure 425.16(b). Plus, it furthers the purposes of the Erie doctrine.

However, there are some important limitations of note. First, a court may not strike a federal question under the anti-SLAPP statute.

Second, the discovery limiting aspects of 425.16(f) and (g) may not apply.

There is a bit of a split of authority on this issue. Some courts have held that (f) and (g) directly collide with Rule 56 and others have not. For example, the Central District held that there was no collision between Rule 56 and (f) and (g), whereas the Eastern District believed there was. In fact, the Eastern District announced a test to determine whether a court could apply (f) and (g) where either of the three scenarios applied: (1) the factual basis of the case has been developed through discovery or similar prior proceedings to the extent a motion for summary judgment would be appropriate; or (2) the parties agree that further discovery is not necessary, or (3) the only issue presented by the motion is an issue of law and the motion is suitable for decision as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

This information is important alike to SLAPPers (defendants) and SLAPPfeasors (plaintiff) for obvious strategic reasons.

Choose your forum carefully, if you have the option to do so.

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We are a "do it yourself" nation. If you don't believe me, just take a look at the "how to" section of any bookstore or library and you'll see what I'm talking about. There are books on how to do just about anything, including practicing law. Now, I'm not here to knock those kinds of books because they have their place. I understand that the economy is tough for a lot of people and, truthfully, some of these books are a good starting point for common legal issues. But what happens if you're dealing with a very specific and complex legal issue? Do you really think that Internet research will be enough? I think you'd agree with me that it's certainly not enough.

What you need is legal representation from a lawyer who has experience in the kind of case you need to be handled. It is not enough that he or she has practiced for 30 years as a general litigator if you are dealing with a defamation action or a SLAPP case. Nor is it enough that he or she works for a big firm or has a fancy website. The lawyer who you are talking to must have experience dealing with the specific issue you need him or her to handle. Let me give you an example to illustrate.

Today I was in court in Los Angeles on a matter and I happened to notice across the way (in another courtroom) that there was an anti-SLAPP motion on calendar relating to a libel matter. Given that this is one of the main practice areas I concentrate on (and my personal fascination with the topic), I thought it would be interesting to hear the oral argument. Boy was I shocked!

The judge, who has been on the bench for a number of years (and who has a good reputation), totally got the law wrong. I mean, it wasn't even close (I felt compelled to stand up and say something, but thankfully I thought better of it). 

So, if even an experienced and well-regard jurist can get the law wrong, how much more likely will it be that a general civil litigator with little-to-no experience will get it wrong?

My point is: Do not gamble by doing it yourself. This also applies to attorneys as well. I don't know how many times an attorney has called me after the "damage has been done," and they tell me: "gee, I wish I would have called you sooner." Happens a lot.

So do yourself a favor and eliminate the "do it yourself" mentality. You don't pull out your own cavities so don't try to practice law on your own. 

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I was not surprised last week when a Judge said that anti-SLAPP is a complicated area of law—it most certainly is. There are well over 350 published decisions on the subject, including several California Supreme court decisions. I often tell other lawyers that they need to be very careful in crafting their papers in support of or in opposition to an anti-SLAPP motion. One such piece of advice I often give is to be sure to comply with section 425.16(j)(1).

Section 425.16(j)(1) states:

“(j)(1) Any party who files a special motion to strike pursuant to this section, and any party who files an opposition to a special motion to strike, shall, promptly upon so filing, transmit to the Judicial Council, by e-mail or facsimile, a copy of the endorsed, filed caption page of the motion or opposition, a copy of any related notice of appeal or petition for a writ, and a conformed copy of any order issued pursuant to this section, including any order granting or denying a special motion to strike, discovery, or fees.”

This means that a party filing or opposing an anti-SLAPP motion must promptly transmit an endorsed copy of the caption page to the Judicial Council.

But what happens if the moving party fails to do so? Can the court deny the motion based on failure to comply with this provision alone?

Well, I came across an unpublished California decision in which the court decided that very question in the negative.

Here’s why:

• The statute does not specify a penalty for non-compliance
• There is no case law interpreting the statute to provide for a penalty for non-compliance
• It was reasonable to conclude that if the legislature wanted to create such a penalty, it would have expressly done so
• There was no prejudice to the other party

I think the court reached the right decision. The purpose of subdivision (j) is to monitor the number of anti-SLAPP motions and decisions to determine its effect—not to punish a non-complying party. However, you don't want to be in the position of making the bulleted arguments mentioned above. So, make sure you promptly transmit an endorsed copy of the caption page to the Judicial Council. You can do so by e-mail at: SLAPP@jud.ca.gov.

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Some people have complained lately that I've been way too focused on anti-SLAPP law here. Well, there's a reason for that. 

It's because SLAPP law plays an important part in just about every defamation case involving matters of public interest. It would be like talking about the Lakers without talking about Lamar Odom or Pau Gasol. Sure Kobe is the star of the team, but the other players invariably play a key role in each game (can you tell that I'm a Lakers fan?).

But I digress.

What I'd like to talk about today is a type of evidence that is routinely introduced by one party in support or opposition to an anti-SLAPP motion, and yet, the receiving party RARELY objects to this type of evidence!

What am I talking about?

I'm talking about judicially noticed court documents and/or declarations.

“ ‘Judicial notice is the recognition and acceptance by the court, for use by the trier of fact or by the court, of the existence of a matter of law or fact that is relevant to an issue in the action without requiring formal proof of the matter.’ [Citation.] The court may in its discretion take judicial notice of any court record in the United States. (Evid.Code, § 451.) This includes any orders, findings of facts and conclusions of law, and judgments within court records." '

Kilroy v. State (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 145.

Therefore, while courts make take judicial notice of any "orders, findings of facts and conclusions of law," they may not consider hearsay statements in court records "for their truth unless an independent hearsay exception exists." North Beverly Park Homeowners Assn. v. Bisno (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 762, 777.

As my Civil Procedure professor used to say, let's take an example and "flesh this out a bit." Suppose you are a plaintiff who is suing a defendant for defamation based on allegations that you had embezzled money from a publicly traded company. Defendant made the alleged defamatory comments on a forum dedicated to discussion about the publicly traded company.

Defendant files an anti-SLAPP motion and accompanying request for judicial notice of a shoplifting conviction on your record from over 30 years ago (during your misguided/misspent youth). There is a police report and several witness statements included in the court records.

Can the court consider the conviction for its truth? YES, according to the evidence code.

Can the court consider the statements in the police report and witness statements for their truth? NO because they are hearsay and require an independent hearsay exception in order to come in.

See the difference?

This is vitally important because whether you win or lose on an anti-SLAPP motion may depend on evidentiary rulings made by the judge.

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Once a defendant makes its threshold showing that a complaint arises under protected activity, the plaintiff must demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits. This means a plaintiff must state and substantiate a legally sufficient claim. Premier Med. Mgmt. Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guar. Ass'n (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 464. Stated another way, plaintiff "'must demonstrate the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.'" Gilbert v. Sykes (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 13, 26, citing, Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821.

"If the pleadings are not adequate to support a cause of action, the plaintiff has failed to carry his burden in resisting the motion. (See Vogel v. Felice (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1018-1019, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 350 (Vogel ); FN7 Drum v. Bleau, Fox & Associates (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1018-1019, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 602 [“[S]pecial motions to strike pursuant to section 425.16 ‘operate “like a demurrer or motion for summary judgment in ‘reverse.’ ” ' (Briggs, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1123, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 969 P.2d 564, citing College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 718-719, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 898, 882 P.2d 894." (Emphasis added).

Just like a demurrer, if a plaintiff fails to state a cause of action it will be stricken. Therefore, it is critically important for a plaintiff to carefully draft its complaint.  Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts in its complaint in order to state each cause of action. It may not be enough for plaintiff to state certain facts for the first time in its opposition to an anti-SLAPP motion.

Plaintiff beware.

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I pointed out last week here that anti-SLAPP law is much more complicated and nuanced than you might expect, and therefore, that it could present a legal malpractice TRAP for the unwary. I repeat: drafting an anti-SLAPP motion is not like doing your average demurrer for failure to state a cause of action or motion to strike. It is much more time intensive (in vast majority of cases) and there are well over 350 appellate decisions on the subject. So be careful and become informed.

Anyhow, here's  another example of what I'm talking about (I'll add more blog posts about this in the future as I discover additional pitfalls):

Suppose you're a plaintiff and defendant files an anti-SLAPP motion, which is granted by the court, thereby striking your entire complaint. Defendant immediately files a separate motion for attorneys' fees. You're thinking about appealing the order granting the motion to strike, but you decide, for a number reasons, that you'll wait until the court decides the motion for attorneys' fees.

Bad decision.

The time to appeal an order on an anti-SLAPP motion begins to run when the order is entered by the judge, without regard to any later motion for attorneys' fees. This means you can't wait until the judge decides the motion for attorneys' fees to appeal the order on the anti-SLAPP motion.  See Russell v. Foglio (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 653, 659-661.

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The mere threat of an anti-SLAPP motion (or serving the motion on the other party) may be sufficient to cause them to dismiss the suit before a hearing on the merits. Under those circumstances, are there consequences for the dismissing party?

The court in Moore faced this issue and presented it clearly:

"This appeal addresses the question whether the plaintiff in a SLAPP suite (a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) can, by the device of dismissing the SLAPP prior to a hearing on the defendant's motion to strike the complaint, avoid paying the attorney's fees incurred by the defendant in defending the suit."

Defendant filed a cross-complaint and then Plaintiff filed an anti-SLAPP motion.  Defendant dismissed its cross-complaint before the hearing on the motion to strike. Plaintiff made a motion to recover its attorneys' fees and the trial court denied Plaintiff's request because it could not be said that Plaintiff was the "prevailing party" under section 425.16(c) since there was no hearing on the matter.

Plaintiff appealed the ruling and the Court of Appeal reversed and remanded.

Moore held that appellant had the right to have his anti-SLAPP motion heard even though the cross-complaint had been dismissed prior to the hearing. It looked to the stated purpose of the anti-SLAPP, which is to give financial relief to a victim of a SLAPP suit and punish a person who files such a suit. It reasoned, correctly in my view, that allowing a person to file a SLAPP suit and then withdraw it prior to a hearing would frustrate the purpose of the statute.

This does not mean that a person who files an anti-SLAPP motion in this scenario would be automatically entitled to attorney's fees. The court would have to determine the merits of the motion.

" . . . a plaintiff's voluntary dismissal of a suit, after a section 425.16 motion has been filed, neither automatically precludes a court from awarding a defendant attorney's fees and costs under that section, nor automatically requires such an award."

The moral of this story: Make sure your suit is solid before you file it if it appears that it may be subject to an anti-SLAPP motion.

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The purpose of the so-called “SLAPP” statute is to eliminate lawsuits brought “primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.” Code Civ. Proc. Section 425.16(a).

Courts engage in a two-part analysis focusing first on whether the disputed cause of action arises from protected activity under the statute, and if it does, proceeding secondly to whether the plaintiff can establish a probability of prevailing on the merits. Ampex Corp. v. Cargle (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1576.  

Statements or writings made in a public place or forum are protect activity under section 425.16(e)(3) if they are connected with an issue of public interest.

But what is a public place or forum?

It has been defined as: " . . . a place open to the use of the general public for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions." Kurwa v. Harrington, Foxx, Dubrow & Canter LLP (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 841, 846.

The term "public form" for purposes of anti-SLAPP analysis, includes settings and contexts not covered by the First Amendment.

Internet websites are a public forum where they " . . . are accessible to anyone who chooses to visit the site." Kronemyer v. Internet Movie Database (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 941, 950.

Parks, streets, public squares, and other public places are public forums. Zhao v. Wong (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1125-1126 (overruled on other grounds: citation omitted).

Interestingly enough, courts differ as to whether news media publications (e.g. newspapers, magazines) are a public forum. 

Some courts believe news media publications are not a public forum because access is limited, in that editors have final authority as to what is published. Weinberg v. Feisel (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1130-1131. In contrast, other courts have held that a local newspaper or a magazine is a public forum. Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1039; Maranatha Corrections, LLC v. Dept. of Corrections & Rehab. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1086.

This is a split in authority that the California Supreme Court needs to resolve.

Here's why:

suppose a blog post is written by a staff writer of the Los Angeles Times about unscrupulous mortgage lending practices. The post is an expose about a specific mortgage lending company and is extremely damaging, if the statements in the post are true.

Are the statements made in a public forum? It does not appear that they would be under Wiesel. The news media defendant would be unable to avail itself of section 425.15(e)(3), even if the allegations were without merit, therefore.

Take the hypothetical even further, imagine that in response to the blog post a reader posts a comment to the blog, which is potentially actionable defamation (also assume that the comments are not moderated). Does this now become a public forum because the editor has chosen not to moderate the comments, and therefore, does not retain final authority as to the content appearing on the post? Or, does the fact that the editor (or the company, likely) has chosen not to moderate the comments means he or she has relinquished his or her "final authority" as to what is published?

Do you see the problem here? This is a question which needs to be resolved sooner than later.

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The California Court of Appeal, Sixth District, answered this question in Sheppard v. Lightpost Museum Fund (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 654.

In that case the court held that a superior court cannot " . . . grant a motion to strike an arbitration claim filed only in an agreed arbitral forum and not asserted by the claimant in any complaint, cross-complaint or petition filed in court."

In other words, an arbitration claim is not subject to an anti-SLAPP motion. The court came to this conclusion for two main reasons: (1) a plain reading of the statute reveals that arbitration claims are not included in the statute; and (2) the purpose of the statute is to prevent abuses of the judicial process and the judicial process is very much different than an arbitration.

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