What Is An Injunction And Why Should You Care?

An injunction is a court order that requires someone to do something or prevents them from doing something.  There are a few different types of injunctions, but I'm only going to discuss the two that apply to defamation cases.


The first is a preliminary injunction.  In California, in order to establish a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must show:  (1) a likelihood of prevailing on the merits and, (2) that the harm to the plaintiff from not granting the injunction outweighs the harm to defendant if the injunction is issued before trial.  A preliminary injunction is extremely advantageous to a plaintiff in a defamation case. It allows plaintiff to stop defendant from making certain defamatory comments/statements about plaintiff. Very powerful.  However, they're rarely granted because California courts are extremely protective of speech.  

On the other hand, I find that courts are much more likely to grant a preliminary injunction if internet defamation is involved.  Why do I believe this?  Because of the nature of the internet.  A person's reputation can be destroyed virtually instantly and it never really goes away.  A court may view this as unfair and attempt to right the "wrong."  What is certain is that courts are struggling to apply old legal rules and concepts to the internet.

The second type of injunction is a permanent injunction.  California courts will grant a permanent injunction only after a trial.  Essentially, whatever statement(s) the judge or jury determined to be defamatory, can be permanently enjoined.  That means you can never utter those statement(s) about plaintiff ever again, unless you want to risk being held in contempt.  Which you don't.

Proposed Federal Anti-SLAPP Legislation

One of the websites I check often is California Anti-SLAPP Project ("CASP").  CASP was founded in 1991 and has been instrumental in shaping California's anti-SLAPP statute.  To put this statement in perspective, California was the first state to enact a so-called anti-SLAPP statute.  Now nearly thirty states have such a statute.  CASP was also involved in advancing AB2433, a new civil discovery law, which is very protective of online speech.


Now CASP is leading an effort to enact Federal Anti-SLAPP Legislation.  A previous coalition of supporters attempted to do the same in 1995, but were ultimately unsuccessful.  If the proposed legislation is enacted, it could have a dramatic impact on how defamation cases would be decided at the federal level.

I look forward to reviewing the proposed legislation when it is completed.

[Editors note:  a previous version of this post stated that a draft had been completed and was posted on CASP's website.  In actuality, the bill that is posted on CASP's website was supported in 1995 but failed for various reasons.  The subject of this post is a yet to be drafted piece of legislation.]


Oprah Winfrey Seeks Dismissal of Defamation Lawsuit

The ex-head mistress of Oprah Winfrey's Leadership Academy for Girls sued Winfrey last month in Philadelphia for defamation, based on certain alleged comments made by Winfrey.  For example, the complaint alleges that Winfrey said, "I thought she cared about the girls of South Africa."  The implication being, according to the Complaint, that the ex-head mistress was not trustworthy.


My point in writing this post is not to focus on the alleged defamatory comments, but rather to zero in on the jurisdictional argument made by Winfrey's attorneys because it is a common scenario in the defamation context.  For more detail about the facts of the case read the Complaint itself or the piece written by Mary Claire Dale of the Associated Press.

Winfrey's attorneys are attempting to dismiss the case on jurisdictional and other grounds.  Specifically, they are bringing a 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Based on the Complaint and the Motion, it appears that they will prevail.

Since Pennsylvania's long arm statute is co-extensive with the Due Process of clause of the Constitution, the inquiry is whether exercising personal jurisdiction over Winfrey comports with the Due Process clause.  That is, there must be general or specific jurisdiction.

Her attorneys argue that general jurisdiction is lacking because no facts are alleged in the Complaint establishing systematic and continuous contacts with the forum by Ms. Winfrey--only a conclusory allegation that "Defendants carry on a systematic and continuous part of their business with the Commonwealth and transact business in the Commonwealth."  Further, they argue that Winfrey has not conducted personal business in Pennsylvania such that she should reasonably expect to be haled into court in Pennsylvania. Finally, they contend that while the entity defendants (Harpo, et al.) may broadcast into Pennsylvania or do business their this is not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over Winfrey.

Winfrey's attorneys also argue that specific jurisdiction is lacking as well based on their analysis of the so-called Calder effects test.  Calder v. Jones 465 U.S. 783 (1984).  Under that test, the allegation must demonstrate that:  (1) defendant committed an intentional tort; (2) plaintiff felt the brunt of the harm in the forum, such that the forum could be said to be the focal point of the harm suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the tort; and (3) the defendant expressly aimed his or her tortious conduct at the forum such that the forum can be said to be the focal point of the tortious activity.

Ignore elements one and two of the Calder test for the moment.  Here is where most courts, in my humble opinion, will be spending their time analyzing cases likes these and others like it (think internet defamation cases).  As Winfrey's counsel correctly point out, plaintiff must be able to show that Winfrey "manifested behavior intentionally targeted at and focused on the forum." (Citation omitted).  It appears that this will be very difficult since the alleged defamation took place outside of Pennsylvania; Winfrey never published the statements in Pennsylvania; and the subject matter does not appear to relate to Pennsylvania.

Therefore, it appears that the motion to dismiss will be granted.  I look forward to reading Plaintiff's response, however.  




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Does The Discovery Rule Apply To Defamation Cases?

Yesterday I wrote about the statute of limitations for an action for libel or slander, which is one year. But when does the clock start running, or in legal terms, when the does the action begin to accrue? For torts, the answer is generally when the injury occurred.  But that's not always the case.  In some situations, courts will apply the so-called "Discovery Rule."  This rule holds that the statute of limitations will not begin to run on a cause of action until such time the injured party discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, the defendant's alleged defamation.


However, in Shively v. Bozanich (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1230, the court held: 

"[w]hen the basis for a claim has been published in the public record or has been the subject of publicity, several cases have declined to apply the discovery rule, commenting that the plaintiff may be expected to be sufficiently diligent to discover the basis for his or her claim within the statutory period."

Does this seem fair to you?  And how would it apply to defamatory remarks buried in the deep, dark recesses of the Internet?

Maybe we can glean something from the court's following remarks:

"We can see no justification for applying the discovery rule to delay the accrual of plaintiff's causes of action beyond the point at which their factual basis became accessible to plaintiff to the same degree as it was accessible to every other member of the public."

I interpret this to mean that the discovery rule does not apply when the basis for a defamation lawsuit is contained in information available to the public.  Since courts have held that information on the internet is public, I believe that under the Shively holding, the discovery rule would not apply in situations where internet defamation involved.

That means you have one year to file a defamation lawsuit from the time it gets published or posted to the Internet.

Does this seem fair to you?  I'd like to hear your thoughts on the matter.

How Long Can You Wait To File A Defamation Lawsuit?

In California, you have one year from the date of publication in which to file an action for libel and slander.  Code of Civil Procedure § 340(c).  That's right.  Only one year.  Lawyers call this a "statute of limitations."  Therefore, do not wait to file a defamation claim or you may lose the right to do so.



Foreign Court Decides Linking To Third Party Content Is Not Libel

The Canadian Supreme Court held that linking to third party content is not libel in Crookes v. Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. (Sup. Ct. Aug. 29, 2008).  For a detailed discussion of the case, read Jeffrey D. Neuburger's post at Mediashift.  


Since the court limited its ruling to the particular facts of the case, it left open the possibility of future libel claims based on linking where the link in question satisfies the publication requirement.  In fact, the court provided a helpful hint to determine whether publication may be satisfied.  Essentially, if the hyperlink to the alleged defamatory content is preceded or followed by commentary depicting, characterizing, or expanding upon the linked-to material, it may rise to the level of a publication.

If you've read this far you may be asking yourself, "who cares what a foreign court thinks?  I live in the United States--foreign law doesn't apply to me."  

The truth of the matter is that the U.S. Supreme Court cares and has been known to consider foreign law in rendering its decisions (read my brief post on the matter here).  The odds of the U.S. Supreme Court considering a Canadian decision would seem to be higher as compared to other foreign decisions since Canada shares a common legal heritage with the U.S. and is our neighbor.  Add to that the fact that internet law is new and challenging and the possibilities increase even further.







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Linking to third-party content: Does Section 230 Provide Immunity?

Eric Goldman of the Technology Law Blog seems to think so and I agree.  The Communications Decency Act was passed in 1996 and later was interpreted by courts to immunize internet service providers form torts committed by users of their systems.  In specific, it says:


"No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider."

This means generally that a plaintiff cannot sue the operator of a site for defamation for comments made by a third party.  While no case has squarely addressed the issue at hand, it would seem that Section 230 of the CDA would prevent a plaintiff from suing the operator of a site for hyperlinks to alleged defamatory content.  The opposite conclusion would lead to absurd results.  Any reference to alleged defamatory material could be the subject of a lawsuit.  This would cage speech on the Internet.  





Lawyer In Defamation Case Sanctioned $14,000

A lawyer being sued by a New York law firm for defamation made the unfortunate mistake of attempting to implead opposing counsel as a third-party defendant in the lawsuit.  As a result, the attorney was sanctioned by the court in the sum of $14,000 for employing a "frivolous" tactic.  For more about this story, read the Corporate Legal Times.  


This story illustrates an important point.  It is inappropriate to attack opposing counsel in defamation cases (or in any case for that matter) because the attorney is simply doing his or her job.  Furthermore, do you really want to harm the reputation of a defamation attorney?  Instead of attacking your adversary's attorney, focus on the issues at hand.  Typically, all your opponent is seeking is a takedown of the alleged offending material.

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Plaintiffs May Remain Anonymous In Internet Defamation Cases

Lisa H. Miller writes in the Internet Defamation Law Blog about Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant # 1, 06-1590-cv (2nd Cir. 2008), a case which addresses the question:  "Can a plaintiff sue anonymously in an internet defamation setting?"  The answer is yes, as long as the plaintiff's need to remain anonymous outweighs the public's need for disclosure.  While this decision isn't exactly ground-breaking (since the 9th Circuit already addressed the question of whether a litigant may sue anonymously in Does I through XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2000)), it is instructive because the court listed a set of factors to consider determine whether plaintiff's desire for anonymity outweighs the public's need for disclosure.  For example, "(f) whether defendant is prejudiced by allowing plaintiff to press claims anonymously."  I mean, when wouldn't a defendant be prejudiced by a court allowing plaintiff to file anonymously?


In any event, It will be interesting to see if other courts adopt these factors and how they choose to apply them.



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Does the U.S. Need A National Speech Code?

I wrote a post not too long ago about "defamation of religion" and the United Nations.  After reading Steven Groves' excellent article, "Why the U.S. Should Oppose "Defamation of Religions" Resolutions at the United Nations", I am firmly convinced that the First Amendment as we understand it today is in danger.  It is well known that Supreme Court justices have increasingly relied upon international law to evaluate and interpret U.S. law.  As a result, the U.S. must continue to oppose the United Nations' attempts to make the State the arbiter of religious beliefs.  This is serious.

New Civil Discovery Law Protects Online Speech

Internet defamation attorneys and bloggers listen up!  A new law will take effect in California on January 1, 2009, which allows online speakers to obtain attorney's fees if they successfully oppose a subpoena to obtain their personally identifying information in California involving out-of-state litigation.


AB2433 was signed into law by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger on September 30, 2008.  It amends Civil Code of Procedure sections 1987.1 and 1987.2.

Section 1987.2 reads:

(b) If a motion is filed under Section 1987.1 for an order to quash or modify a subpoena from a court of this state for personally identifying information, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 1798.79.8 of the Civil Code, for use in an action pending in another state, territory, or district of the United States, or in a foreign nation, and that subpoena has been served on any Internet service provider, or on the provider of any other interactive computer service, as defined in Section 230(f)(2) of Title 47 of the United States Code, if the moving party prevails, and if the underlying action arises from the moving party's exercise of free speech rights on the Internet and the respondent has failed to make a prima facie showing of a cause of action, the court shall award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees."

Notice the attorney's fees clause is mandatory.  That means if the "moving party prevails" the court is required to award the moving party attorney's fees.  But what does the term "prevails" mean?  What if the moving party simply seeks a modification of the subpoena request?  Would that mean the moving party had prevailed?

This new law is also important because it addresses a loophole created in the Tendler decision, which held that subpoenas are not subject to an anti-SLAPP motion because they do not constitute a "cause of action."  This allowed litigants to file a claim (perhaps frivolous in some instances) out of state and request a subpoena in California with virtual impunity.  Not anymore.  AB2433 closes this loophole.

This law will affect the way internet defamation claims are litigated in California, nationwide, and perhaps even the world.  It's significance cannot be overstated.
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How Long After the 60-Day Period Can You File An Anti-SLAPP Motion?

The purpose of an anti-SLAPP motion in California is to dispose of lawsuits at an early stage of litigation. The motion must be filed within 60 days of the filing of the complaint, unless a court expressly allows a late filing. CCP § 425.16(f). While courts generally have wide discretion to allow late filings, no court has squarely decided the issue--how long is too long? That is, until now. In Platypus wear, Inc. v. Goldberg (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 772, the court decided the question of whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting a party's request to file an anti-SLAPP after 60 days.

The appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the defendant to file a late anti-SLAPP motion nearly two years after the initial complaint was filed. It reasoned that the purpose of the statute is to ensure prompt resolution of cases aimed at chilling speech. The court stated that the defendant failed to offer a "compelling explanation" or any "extenuating circumstances" for the delay. Also key to the court's decision was the fact that the defendant did not file the motion until after the parties had conducted substantial discovery. And since one of the chief reasons behind the anti-SLAPP statute is to protect defendants from being subjected to costly discovery, the court determined that the motion was simply untimely.

The lesson is clear hear: File an anti-SLAPP motion within the 60 day period. It's simply not worth the risk to wait whatever the reason.